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DEFINING "TRADE OR BUSINESS"
UNDER THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE:
A SURVEY OF RELEVANT CASES
E. JOHN LOPEZ
I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase "trade or business" is used repeatedly throughout
the Internal Revenue Code.1 Despite its widespread use, the phrase
is not defined either in the Code2 or in the Treasury Regulations.3
However, the phrase has been developed and refined over the years
through judicial interpretation.4 One court has stated that the
question of whether a particular set of facts comes within the
realm of trade or business appears to be, like many other legal
points, one which is being marked out by the judicial process of
inclusion and exclusion most commonly associated with distinc-
tions of degree rather than kind.5 Unfortunately, courts have cho-
sen different paths in their search for a definition. One is left with
much uncertainty as to whether any particular set of facts consti-
tutes a trade or business.
The question of whether an income-producing activity consti-
tutes a trade or business is important in determining which, and to
what extent, expenses attributable to that activity can be de-
ducted. Although the Code and the Regulations do not provide a
definition, the Internal Revenue Service has defined "trade or bus-
iness" as
an activity carried on for livelihood or for profit. For an activity
to be considered a business, a profit motive must be present and
some type of economic activity must be involved. It is distin-
guished from an activity engaged in purely for personal
satisfaction.
A business usually has regular transactions that produce in-
come. To carry out these transactions, it has to incur a number of
expenses.... The difference between the amount of money it
takes in.. . and the amount it pays out is its profit or loss. If in
1. According to one commentator, the Code of the late 1950's contained more than 170
references to "trade or business." See Saunders, "Trade or Business," Its Meaning Under
the Internal Revenue Code, 1960 MAoR TAx PLAN. 693, 693.
2. There are a few definitions limited to special situations, such as I.R.C. §§ 355(b),
502(b) & 7701(a)(26) (CCH 1983).
3. Roth, Trade or Business Requirement of Sec. 162 and the Deductibility of Preoccu-
pancy Expenses Incurred in Rental Real Estate Projects, 57 TAxEs 33, 39 (1979).
4. See Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234 (1980).
5. White's Will v. Comm'r, 119 F.2d 619, 621 (3d Cir. 1940).
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one year your business has a loss because you have little or no
income to offset your expenses, there may be a question as to
whether a business was carried on in that year.
You should be able to show annually by facts and circum-
stances that you were in business during that year.6
As to what actually constitutes a trade or business, one must
consult the relevant case law construing the phrase. This comment
will present a brief summary of relevant cases tracing the evolution
of the phrase and then follow with a discussion of its use in two
areas which often give rise to litigation: (1) the investor who ex-
pends time and money in the management of his personal securi-
ties portfolio, and (2) the person who promotes, develops, and
finances various business enterprises, especially those corporations
which are closely or solely-held.
While this survey explores the outer bounds of what constitutes
a trade or business, the reader will come away with only the
broadest generalizations. Examining the case law will provide the
best direction available, but unfortunately will also leave many
questions unanswered.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE TERM "TRADE OR BUSINESS"
The first significant judicial effort to define "trade or business"
came in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 7 In that case, the Supreme Court
stated:
"Business" is a very comprehensive term and embraces every-
thing about which a person can be employed. . . . "[It is] that
which occupies the time, attention and labor of men for the pur-
pose of a livelihood or profit. .. ."
We think it is clear that corporations organized for the purpose
of doing business, and actually engaged in such activities as leas-
ing property, collecting rents, managing office buildings, making
investments of profits, or leasing ore lands and collecting royal-
ties, managing wharves, dividing profits, and in some cases invest-
ing the surplus, are engaged in business within the meaning of
this statute, and in the capacity necessary to make such organiza-
tions subject to the law.8
In 1940, the Supreme Court refined its definition in Deputy v.
6. IRS PUB. No. 334, TAX GUIDE FOR SMALL BUSINESs 2 (1981) (emphasis added).
7. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
8. Id. at 171 (citations omitted).
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du Pont.9 In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated
that 'carrying on any trade or business,' within the contemplation
of section 23(a), involves holding one's self out to others as en-
gaged in the selling of goods or services."' 0 Moreover, Justice
Frankfurter noted that "[e]xpenses for transactions not connected
with trade or business, such as an expense for handling personal
investments, are not deductible.""
The next stage in the evolution of the phrase occurred one year
later in the case of Higgins v. Commissioner.' In Higgins, the tax-
payer devoted considerable time to the management of his exten-
sive holdings in real estate, stocks and bonds. He hired a staff to
assist him and rented office space in New York and Paris. The of-
fices kept records, made deposits, received securities, interest and
dividend checks, forwarded weekly and annual reports, and gener-
ally undertook the care of Higgins' investments.' Higgins claimed
the expenses associated with the management of his portfolio as
business expenses deductible in the computation of his adjusted
gross income. 14 The Commissioner disallowed the deduction.5
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Higgins urged
that the continuity, constant repetition, regularity, and magnitude
of his activities elevated him from the class of small investors and
therefore qualified him as being in the trade or business of invest-
ing. The Supreme Court, in deciding whether this activity consti-
tuted a trade or business, formulated a test which has since re-
ceived widespread use. The Court stated that a determination of
whether a taxpayer's activities rise to the level of trade or business
requires an examination of the facts in each case.' Although the
Court was less than precise in formulating the appropriate analyti-
cal framework for Higgins-type cases, it was clear on one point. In
regards to whether personal investment activity could ever rise to
the level of a trade or business, the Court said that "no matter how
large the estate or how continuous or extended the work required
may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law to permit
the courts to reverse the decision" that such activities do not con-
9. 308 U.S. 488 (1940).
10. Id. at 499 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Section 23(a) referred to in the quote is now
found at I.R.C. § 162(a) (CCH 1983).
11. du Pont, 308 U.S. at 499.
12. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
13. Id. at 213-14.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 217.
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stitute carrying on a business."
The next important step in the evolution of the term "trade or
business" occurred in Gentile v. Commissioner.8 The petitioner in
Gentile was a full-time gambler. In addition to betting on the hor-
ses, he also derived income from his other gambling activities, in-
cluding private wagers on televised sports events, and card and
dice games. Although Gentile had a criminal record of arrests and
convictions for gambling-related offenses, during the year in issue
he did not operate a gambling establishment, place wagers for
other persons, maintain an office, or give gambling advice for
which he was compensated. "His activity was confined to putting
his own money 'on the table.' """
After Gentile filed his tax return, the Service assessed a defi-
ciency claiming Gentile was engaged in a trade or business.20 Gen-
tile, while readily admitting the regularity of his gambling activi-
ties, maintained that he was not in a trade or business because he
neither provided nor held himself out as a provider of any goods or
services to any other person. The Service, instead of limiting a
trade or business to the offering of goods or services to others, ar-
gued that it is the individual's everyday efforts to earn a living,
characterized by continuity, regularity, and a profit motive that
constitute business activity.2 1
The Tax Court heard the case and held that while these three
elements may be necessary to establish that Gentile was engaged
17. Id. After the Higgins decision Congress enacted I.R.C. § 212 to make available to
investors the section 162 deductions. Section 212 now makes deductible all the ordinary and
necessary business expenses for the production or collection of income or for the manage-
ment, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income. It does
not extend the concept of trade or business to personal investment. According to a discus-
sion in the Congressional Record regarding the proposed § 212:
Trade or business has received such a narrow interpretation that many meritori-
ous deductions are denied. The Supreme Court, in the case of Higgins v. Comm'r,
held that expenses in connection with a taxpayer's investments in income-produc-
ing properties were not deductible, on the ground that making casual investments
was not a trade or business. Since the income from such investments is clearly
taxable it is inequitable to deny the deduction of expenses attributable to such
investments.
To cure this inequity, the bill contains a provision which will allow taxpayers to
deduct expenses incurred for the production or collection of income whether or
not such expenses are connected with the taxpayer's trade or business.
88 CONG. REc. 6376 (1942) (citations omitted).
18. 65 T.C. 1 (1975).
19. Id. at 2-3.
20. The Service took this position in order to subject Gentile to the self-employment tax
imposed by I.R.C. § 1401.
21. Id. at 3.
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in a trade or business, something more than the production of in-
come for federal income tax purposes is required. The court, rely-
ing on the test formulated by Justice Frankfurter in du Pont, reit-
erated that "trade or business" contemplates "holding one's self
out to others." Thus, the court reasoned, since Gentile was not
"holding himself out to others" as a businessman when he placed
his bets, he was not in the trade or business of gambling and there-
fore was not subject to the self-employment tax of section 1401.
The court said this activity was similar to the study of market re-
ports for the management of one's investment portfolio-an activ-
ity "clearly not within the bounds of a trade or business."22
Finally, one of the most recent stops in the journey to define
trade or business, and one which signaled the abandonment of the
"holding one's self out" test, is the case of Ditunno v. Commis-
sioner." In Ditunno the sole issue, like that in Gentile, was
whether a full-time gambler's losses are deductible as a trade or
business expense.
Anthony J. Ditunno was a full-time gambler, having no other
profession or employment. During the years 1977 to 1979,4
Ditunno gambled on the horse races six days a week, year round.
He did not bet on every race, but instead studied racing forms and
bet mainly on the "doubles" and "trifecta" races. Ditunno never
placed bets on behalf of other persons, nor did he sell tips to other
gamblers. He never received commissions and was not a book-
maker. The Service rejected Ditunno's attempt to claim trade or
business deductions and determined deficiencies in his income tax.
Ditunno refused to accept the Service's position and chose instead
to take his case to the Tax Court.2
Arguing his case pro se, Ditunno claimed his gambling losses as
deductions from gross income. Specifically, he claimed his gam-
bling losses were trade or business deductions, qualifying under
section 62(1).26 The Service maintained that Ditunno was not in
22. Id. at 6. The court cited Higgins as support for this proposition.
23. [Current Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 39,888, at 2857 (Feb. 7, 1983).
24. The Service determined deficiencies in Ditunno's federal income taxes for these
three years. The amount of each deficiency was $1,992 for 1977, $2,364 for 1978, and $787
for 1979. [Current Decisions] TAX CT. REP. (CCH) No. 39,888, at 2858.
25. Id.
26. Id. I.R.C. § 62(1) (CCH 1979) states that "the term 'adjusted gross income' means, in
the case of an individual, gross income minus the following deductions: TRADE AND BUSINESS
DEDUCTONS - The deductions allowed by this chapter . ..which are attributable to a
trade or business carried on by the taxpayer."
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the trade or business of gambling.2 7 Therefore, the gambling loss
deductions would not qualify under section 62 as deductions allow-
able in computing adjusted gross income. 5 The Service, reversing
the position it had taken in past cases, relied on the taxpayer's
argument in Gentile for support. The court, after reconsidering the
Gentile test, found it to be overly restrictive.
The Gentile court had cited Snow v. Commissioner" as a Su-
preme Court endorsement of the "holding one's self out" test. But
the Ditunno court rejected the Gentile court's interpretation, stat-
ing that Snow neither affirmed nor adopted Justice Frankfurter's
"goods and services" test. Instead, the court reasoned that the
Snow opinion quoted Justice Frankfurter's language simply for
comparative purposes. "[T]he Snow reference to Justice Frank-
furter's concurrence in Deputy v. DuPont [sic] does not indicate
that the Supreme Court intended to reconsider Higgins or to ap-
prove his definition."3 0 The test promulgated by the Ditunno court
in determining whether an individual is engaged in a trade or busi-
ness is the same that was used in the Higgins decision, where the
Court required an examination of all of the facts and circum-
stances in each case.81
In applying the "facts and circumstances" test to Ditunno's
gambling activities, the court concluded that he was in the trade or
business of gambling within the meaning of section 62(1). The
court noted that Ditunno was not a passive investor managing a
securities or real estate portfolio as was the taxpayer in Higgins.
He was, instead, an active gambler, devoting his full time to gam-
bling activities.
Chief Judge Tannenwald, who authored the Gentile opinion, dis-
sented. He suggested that the majority opinion would "wreak
havoc" on the concept of trade or business which had been devel-
oped over time through the judicial process. In overruling the Gen-
tile "holding one's self out" test, Judge Tannenwald accused the
majority of ignoring both the nature of the "facts and circum-
stances" test and a long-accumulated body of case law. In his view
27. Ditunno, [Current Decisions] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 39,888, at 2858. The Service
argued that the gambling loss deductions were not deductible under § 62 and thus consti-
tuted items of tax preference which would result in the imposition of the alternative mini-
mum tax of § 55.
28. Id.
29. 416 U.S. 500 (1974).
30. Ditunno, [Current Decisions] TAx CT. REP. (CCH) No. 39,888, at 2862.
31. Id. at 2859-60.
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"holding one's self out" was an essential but not necessarily con-
trolling ingredient to support a finding of carrying on a trade or
business. Judge Tannenwald disagreed with the majority's inter-
pretation that Snow does not indicate approval of Justice Frank-
furter's definition. Conceding that the Supreme Court used Justice
Frankfurter's "holding one's self out" definition for comparative
purposes, Judge Tannenwald said:
[T]he fact of the matter is that the Court found it necessary to
select a standard for comparing section 162 [itemized trade or
business deductions] with section 174 [itemized research and ex-
perimental deductions-the section Snow was concerned with]
and, in so doing, selected Justice Frankfurter's holding-out test. If
this does not constitute approval, I do not know what does.32
The day following the Ditunno decision, a memorandum deci-
sion filed in the case of Estate of Cull v. Commissionere3 seemingly
enlarged the class of taxpayers subject to the trade or business tax
provisions. Written by Judge Sterrett, 4 the opinion was based on a
factual situation similar to that of Ditunno. However, the peti-
tioner in Cull, in addition to being an extensive gambler, was also
employed full-time as a pari-mutuel clerk at various racetracks.
When not working at his job, he gathered information for purposes
of placing wagers which he made on an almost daily basis. In chal-
lenging Cull's loss deductions, the Service made no attempt to con-
tradict the taxpayer's position that he was a professional gambler
who devoted substantial time and energy to gambling. Instead, it
relied on the Gentile "holding one's self out" test.35 Rejecting that
test, the court cited Ditunno and said that in determining whether
a gambler was in the trade or business, one must look "to the char-
acter of his gambling activities [to find if they are] sufficiently 'ac-
tive' to elevate them to trade or business status."3 Due to the un-
contradicted testimony, the court held that the petitioner was in
the separate trade or business of gambling.3 7
In a footnote, the court referred to Murphey v. Commissioner,38
for the proposition that a taxpayer may be engaged in more than
32. Id. at 2865 (Tannenwald, C.J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
33. 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 691 (1983).
34. Judge Sterrett had joined Chief Judge Tannenwald's dissenting opinion in Ditunno.
35. Cull, 45 T.C.M. at 692-93.
36. Id. at 692.
37. Id.
38. 73 T.C. 766 (1980).
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one trade or business. In doing so, Cull seems to implicitly extend
the ambit of the trade or business classification further than that
delineated in Ditunno. Ditunno was a full-time gambler having no
other profession or employment. The Ditunno opinion stated: "In
sum, petitioner was an active gambler, devoting his full time to
gambling activities. 3 e By contrast, the petitioner in Cull was em-
ployed full-time as a pari-mutuel clerk. Outside of $129 in interest
and dividend payments, Cull was paid $20,963 for his employment
services during the year in question. 40 Despite his full-time job as a
clerk, Cull was also found to be in the trade or business of gam-
bling. This would seem to open the door to others who actively
pursue the games of chance, not on a full-time basis, but enough to
reach the phantom trade or business status.41
Having given a brief overview of the evolution of the term "trade
or business," the remainder of this comment will focus on the use
of trade or business in two areas which often give rise to litigation:
that of the Higgins-type personal investor and that of the pro-
moter, developer, or financier of business enterprises. Although the
propositions that have developed in either context do not appear
difficult to apply, judicial decisions based on the "facts and cir-
cumstances" test reveal a wide array of activities which may rise to
the level of trade or business. 2 The diverse holdings have
prompted at least one commentator to call for a uniform definition
of the phrase where it is not used in any special context."
The lack of clear criteria has led some courts to find, in some
instances," that taxpayers who do make advances to their closely-
held corporations are, in fact, engaged in a trade or business. Simi-
larly, despite the Higgins decision's admonition that, no matter
how large the estate or how much time one devotes to managing it,
personal investment activity is not a trade or business, different
courts have applied the "facts and circumstances" test to arrive at
the conclusion that such activity can be a trade or business. After a
39. Ditunno, [Current Decisions] TAX CT. RzP. (CCH) No. 39,888, at 2863 (emphasis
added).
40. Cull, 45 T.C.M. at 691.
41. See Gajewski v. Comm'r, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 967 (1983) (Judge Tannenwald finds
gambler to be in the trade or business of gambling without making reference to the amount
of time the taxpayer devoted to his trade).
42. See Saunders, supra note 1, at 726.
43. See Roth, supra note 3, at 39.
44. Different courts seem to apply their own version of the "facts and circumstances"
test.
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taxpayer devotes enough time" to the management of his invest-
ments, he is no longer an investor but instead becomes a securities
trader. Such status is achieved even though he buys and sells for
no one but himself. Achieving the trader status is tantamont to
grasping the brass ring, for it allows one to take trade or business
deductions.
The dissenting opinion in Ditunno predicted "havoc" would re-
sult from the demise of the "holding one's self out" test.46 While
perhaps an overly pessimistic view, it cannot be doubted that
fewer fixed criteria and extensive reliance on the subjective "facts
and circumstances" test will inevitably lead to headaches for the
tax planner. Certainly, the Service's view of the "facts and circum-
stances" will differ greatly from that of the taxpayers. With the
burden of proof being on the taxpayer,47 the likelihood of a chal-
lenge from the Service over trade or business deductions seems
greater.
III. PERSONAL INVESTMENT ACTRTV
A. Investors: No Trade or Business
The starting point of a discussion of trade or business in the
context of personal investments must begin with Higgins. As dis-
cussed previously, the Higgins Court agreed with the Service that
no amount of personal investment activity could rise to the level of
trade or business.48 Of greater importance, the Court formulated
the "facts and circumstances" test to determine whether a tax-
payer's activities constitute a trade or business. Oddly enough,
some courts have used the Higgins test to reach the conclusion
that personal investment activity does rise to the trade or business
level.
An example of strict adherence to the Higgins rationale is the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Purvis v. Commissioner." Additionally,
Purvis highlights the judicial distinction which has evolved be-
tween the securities investor and the securities trader. The peti-
tioner in Purvis sought to be classified as a trader in securities,
45. Once again, the answer to the question of what constitutes sufficient time varies
among courts.
46. Ditunno, [Current Decisions] TAX CT. RFP. (CCH) No. 39,888, at 2864 (Tannenwald,
C.J., dissenting).
47. See U.S. TAX CT. R. PRAc. & PROC. 142(a).
48. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
49. 530 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1976).
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agreeing with the Commissioner that if he were classified as an in-
vestor and not a trader he would not meet the trade or business
requirement. The court, citing the Higgins passage" and the com-
ment in Whipple v. Commissioner,"1 agreed that no amount of in-
vestment activity can rise to the level of trade or business. Drawing
a distinction between a securities trader and a securities investor,52
the court concluded that the petitioner was not a trader. As a basis
for its decision, the court noted that from 1963 to 1968 the peti-
tioner engaged in only seventy-five security sales, of which thirty-
one involved stocks held for more than six months.53 The peti-
tioner visited brokers on the average of three or four days a week
and had listed his occupation as an attorney on his tax returns.
Following the rigid approach of Higgins, the court determined that
he was merely an investor, and thus his activities in purchasing
and selling stock did not meet the trade or business requirement."
This court followed Higgins in holding that an investor does not
qualify as being in a trade or business."
Three cases decided on the "facts and circumstances" test are
Commissioner v. Nubar," Adda v. Commissioner,57 and Chang
Hsiao Liang v. Commissioner." Although two of these cases pro-
duced results dissimilar from Higgins, all three involved decisions
under section 211 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939." Adda
and Nubar will be discussed in the next section, where cases in-
volving taxpayers who have been found to be in a trade or business
are discussed.
The section 211 case in which the Tax Court determined that a
taxpayer was not engaged in a trade or business is Liang. The peti-
tioner in that case was a nonresident alien residing in China who
50. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
51. 373 U.S. 193, 202 (1963). See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
52. Id. An investor purchases securities for capital appreciation and income, usually
without regard to short-term changes on the daily market. A trader, on the other hand,
purchases and sells securities with reasonable frequency in order to catch the swings in the
daily market to profit on a short term basis. See Chang Hsiao Liang v. Comm'r, 23 T.C.
1040, 1043 (1955).
53. Purvis, 530 F.2d at 1334.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
56. 185 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 925 (1951).
57. 10 T.C. 273 (1948).
568. 23 T.C. 1040 (1955).
59. Currently I.R.C. § 871 (CCH 1983). This section provides for the taxation of nonresi-
dent alien individuals engaged in a trade or business within the United States. Under the
1939 Code, the phrase "engaged in a trade or business within the United States" did not
include transactions in commodities, stocks, or securities effected through a resident broker.
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left the management of his considerable account to the sole discre-
tion of his United States agent. The Tax Court held that the ab-
sence of frequent short-term turnover in the portfolio led to the
conclusion that the securities sold were merely part of an invest-
ment activity and did not rise to the level of a trading operation."o
The court cited the extensive transactions in Adda and Nubar as
being quite different from the facts in Liang. Looking over a seven-
year span, the court determined that the petitioner's primary ob-
jective was to establish an investment account in order to ensure a
reliable source of income. Thus, the activity did not rise to the
level of being a trade or business and the Service's deficiency de-
termination was erroneous."'
The issue was recently addressed again in Skoglund v. United
States." There the plaintiff sought to deduct above the line her
expenses associated with her investment activity." Skoglund
claimed that she spent approximately fifteen hours a week on her
investment activities, and this management activity brought her
within the ambit of carrying on a trade or business. She also ar-
gued that she was entitled to the deduction because "common
sense would indicate that taxpayers should be able to reduce in-
come directly through the deduction of related expenses." Like
the taxpayer in Wilson, Skoglund chose to litigate the issue in the
Court of Claims.
60. Liang, 23 T.C. at 1042.
61. Id. at 1045. The importance of the term "trade or business" is evident in the field of
estate management as well. Such was the case in White's Will v. Comm'r, 119 F.2d 619 (3d
Cir. 1940). In that case, the petitioners were trustees of a large estate, the principal asset
being capital stock of the Health Products Corporation. The petitioners sought to deduct
the cost of certain legal proceedings, claiming they were incurred as business expenses in the
trade or business of managing the estate. The Commissioner determined that the manage-
ment of a trust estate did not constitute a trade or business. Id. at 620. On appeal to the
Third Circuit, the court determined that the investing and reinvesting of assets, either by an
individual for himself or by a trustee on behalf of an estate, does not constitute a trade or
business. Quoting Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Bedell v. Comm'r, 30 F.2d 622 (2d Cir.
1929), the court stated: "Most men who have capital change their investments, and may
speculate all the time; we should hardly call this a business, though the line is undoubtedly
hard to draw." 119 F.2d at 621. Thus, the court reasoned, even though the trustees were
required to manage the estate on a daily basis, their situation is analagous to that of an
investor who keeps an eye on the stock market and other investment opportunities. Id. at
622-23.
62. 82-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9270, at 83,609 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
63. Id. The plaintiff originally claimed the deduction as an itemized deduction. However,
she amended her return to take the deduction above the line in arriving at her adjusted
gross income. Id. This was done because her zero-bracket amount was larger than her other
itemized deductions.
64. Id. at 83,610.
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The court rejected both arguments. Citing Whipple, the court
noted that it is difficult for an individual's investment activity to
rise to a level that constitutes a trade or business. The court ruled
as a matter of law that her fifteen hours a week of labor does not
rise to that level. As to the plaintiff's common sense argument, the
court said: "Unfortunately, common sense and tax law are rarely
even waving acquaintances." 5
Perhaps the best taxpayer argument may be found in the recent
case of Cleveland v. Commissioner.66 Between January and May,
1961, the petitioner in Cleveland traded in commodity futures for
his own account. On February 28, 1961, he purchased a seat on the
Chicago Board of Trade. He also established a margin account
with a brokerage firm which cleared his trades for him. By clearing
the trades, the firm acted as a surety and guaranteed that the peti-
tioner would fulfill all of his obligations. On June 7, 1961, the
brokerage firm sold his futures and closed his commodity account,
resulting in a $57,000 loss to the petitioner. The firm paid the Chi-
cago Board of Trade on behalf of the petitioner, but the petitioner
failed to repay his debt to the firm. Eventually the firm sued him
and in 1964 the suit was settled for $8,004, which the petitioner
paid. On his 1964 return he took a $7,500 ordinary loss deduction,
allegedly based on this transaction.6"
After the petitioner was indicted and pled guilty to tax evasion
charges, the Commissioner determined that the futures sold by the
petitioner were capital assets, thus resulting in short-term capital
loss treatment. The petitioner argued that they were ordinary in
nature since he was engaged in the trade or business of commodity
trading. The Tax Court, relegating the decision to a memorandum
opinion, first recharacterized the $8,000 as a loss, noting that the
petitioner accumulated $57,000 worth of commodity losses in 1961
and should have reported them in that year. The settlement of the
suit for $8,000 in 1964 was a separate transaction which arose not
from the 1961 losses, but rather from the petitioner's liability to
his brokerage firm.68
Citing Ditunno and Higgins, the court looked to the facts. In
1961, the petitioner became a member of the Chicago Board of
Trade and made approximately eighty commodity transactions.
During that year, in addition to buying his seat on the Chicago
65. Id.
66. [Current Decisions] TAx CT. MEM. DEc. (CCH) (46 T.C.M.) 257 (May 26, 1983).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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Board of Trade, the petitioner also sold it. He did not report any
gains or losses from the trade or business of commodity trading in
1961. The settlement deduction was reported as a settlement of a
claim against the petitioner. Finally, he failed to keep separate
books and records. The court said: "Viewing these facts together,
we can only conclude that petitioner engaged in commodity futures
trading as a form of personal investment." 9 In light of these facts,
the court determined that the petitioner had not met his burden of
proving that he was in the separate trade or business of commodity
trading. 0
In summary, the recent judicial trend has been to avoid making
a determination of trade or business. This trend is consonant with
the tax maxim that deductions are a matter of legislative grace and
therefore should be strictly construed.71 However, the matter is not
an open and shut case. As the next section demonstrates, some
courts take the view that certain investment activities do in fact
rise to the level of a trade or business.
B. Traders: Trade or Business
The earliest of the three section 211 (1939 Code) cases previ-
ously mentioned is Adda, which involved an Egyptian citizen re-
siding in German-occupied France. Due to the war, the petitioner
was cut off from communications and relied on the sole discretion
of his brother, a United States resident, to manage his investment
portfolio.72 The Tax Court found the petitioner to be engaged in a
trade or business. Looking at the facts of the case, the court deter-
mined that the petitioner's activities constituted trading in securi-
ties. While neither the number of transactions nor the total
amount of money involved was stated, the court pointed to numer-
ous "transactions [being] effected,.. . several accounts... main-
tained, and gains and losses in substantial amounts ... real-
ized. ''7 8 It is unclear how the facts and circumstances of Adda are
sufficiently dissimilar from those in Higgins, where the taxpayer
had "extensive investments," "devoted a considerable portion of
his time" to them, and "hired others to assist him in offices rented
for that purpose. 74 However, in Adda, the court determined that
69. Id. at 279.
70. Id.
71. du Pont, 308 U.S. at 493.
72. Adda, 10 T.C. at 275.
73. Id. at 277.
74. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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the petitioner's activities through his brother-agent had risen
above the mere investor class into the trader status, thus qualify-
ing him as being in the trade or business. As exemplified by these
decisions, the "facts and circumstances" test is clearly a subjective
one which renders an uncertain result.
The final section 211 case is Nubar. The uncertainty of the
"facts and circumstances" test is underscored by the two opinions
issued in that case. The first was the Tax Court's 1949 opinion,
Nubar v. Commissioner.7' The petitioner in Nubar, like the peti-
tioner in Adda, was a wealthy Egyptian. For the three years in
question, the taxpayer reported capital gains of $62,795, $229,224,
and $209,823.6 The taxpayer reported capital gains from trading
in commodities futures of $62,795, $2,775, and $1,660. He also re-
ported dividend and interest income of $34,120, $72,084, and
$100,536. In 1945, he stated the value of his securities to be
$2,496,952 and his liabilities to be $721,423. 7
The Tax Court determined that the petitioner's activities fell
within the statutory exclusion of section 211, and thus did not
achieve trade or business status.78 The court distinguished Adda
by noting that that decision was based on the fact that Adda had
engaged, through his agent-brother, in business in the United
States, while all of the transactions in Nubar were carried on
through a resident broker in conformity with the statute. The
Fourth Circuit reversed.7 9 Recounting the findings of the Tax
Court of the large value of securities and commodities trading en-
gaged in by Nubar,80 the court found the Tax Court's conclusion
"clearly erroneous, whether regarded as a conclusion of fact or as a
conclusion of law.""s The court determined that he was not a non-
resident alien within the meaning of the statutory exclusion and
that he was engaged in a trade or business.
75. Nubar v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 566 (1949).
76. These gains were reported for the years 1941, 1943, and 1944-the three years in
which deficiencies were determined. Id. at 573.
77. Id. at 573-74.
78. The initial hurdle the court had to clear was classifying the petitioner as a nonresi-
dent alien since he lived in the United States from 1939-45. The court considered the facts
and determined that his intention was not to become a United States resident. Mexico de-
nied his visa application four times; France told him he could not return; Spain and Portu-
gal would not issue visas; and war-time conditions made his return to Egypt or Switzerland
either hazardous or impossible. Id. at 570-76.
79. Nubar v. Comm'r, 185 F.2d 584 (4th Cir. 1950).
80. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
81. Nubar, 185 F.2d at 586.
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There can be no question but that the extensive trading in
stocks and commodities constituted engaging in trade or business
within the meaning of the statute.... Higgins... is not to the
contrary.... Nothing was said to indicate that such extensive
trading as was disclosed here would not constitute doing busi-
ness, and the [Higgins] Court pointed out that whether the activ-
ities of a taxpayer constitute "carrying on a business" requires an
examination of the facts in each case.8"
The court obviously chose to ignore Higgins' admonition that
such activity, no matter how large or continuous, does not rise to
the level of a trade or business.8" Instead, the court relied on the
extensive trading involved.8' Evidently the Fourth Circuit viewed
the facts and circumstances in a different light than that of the
Tax Court.
A recent decision from the United States Court of Claims again
emphasizes the unpredictability of the "facts and circumstances"
test. In Moller v. United States,s5 the plaintiffs, a married couple,
managed four portfolios of securities.86 The Mollers, like Mr. Hig-
gins, maintained two offices to conduct their securities manage-
ment, and sought to deduct the cost as an ordinary and necessary
business expense. The Service disallowed the deductions, contend-
ing that the Mollers were not carrying on a trade or business. The
Court of Claims held for the plaintiffs. The court stressed that the
plaintiffs devoted between forty and forty-two hours per week to
their investment activities, subscribed to the Wall Street Journal,
studied corporate financial reports, made numerous securities
transactions, and thus determined that the plaintiffs were carrying
82. Id. at 588 (emphasis supplied).
83. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
84. A comparison of the transactions engaged in by Higgins and Nubar shows that value-
wise their deals were not substantially different. Higgins purchased $675,000 worth of secur-
ities in 1932. Higgins v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A. 1005, 1008 (1939). In 1941, the total value of
Nubar's purchases and sales only rose to $664,896. Nubar, 13 T.C. at 572. In 1933, Higgins
purchased bonds in the amount of $1,052,000. Higgins, 39 B.T.A. at 1008. In 1943 and 1944,
Nubar purchased and sold securities in the amounts of $2,389,743 and $2,179,549, respec-
tively. Nubar, 13 T.C. at 572. Higgins held securities valued at $16,453,000 and $17,278 in
the years 1932 and 1933, respectively. Higgins, 39 B.T.A. at 1008. Nubar held securities
valued at $2,496,952 in 1945. Nubar, 13 T.C. at 572.
85. 553 F. Supp. 1071 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
86. One of the portfolios consisted of securities held by the husband, one held by the
wife, one held in trust from which the husband received income, and one held in trust from
which the wife received income. Id. at 1072. Thus, the management of the portfolios was for
the personal benefit of the plaintiffs.
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on a business."'
The court explained the Supreme Court's comment in Whipple
that "investing is not a trade or business" by saying that the state-
ment should be considered in context. Since the petitioner in
Whipple did not manage a portfolio, the court felt the cases could
be distinguished. The court then went on to distinguish Higgins by
saying that Higgins' activities "were not at all comparable to the
regular, extensive, and continuous activities of the plaintiffs in this
case."as However, according to the facts, Higgins had engaged in
regular, extensive, and continuous activity in the management of
his portfolio. Nevertheless, the Higgins Court stated: "No matter
how large the estate or how continuous or extended the work re-
quired may be, such facts are not sufficient as a matter of law to
permit the courts to reverse the decision of the Board [that this
activity does not constitute a trade or business].""' How the facts
and circumstances of Higgins are "readily distinguishable" from
the facts and circumstances of Moller is, at the very least,
questionable.
IV. THE CORPORATE PROMOTER
Section 166 of the Code,90 pertaining to the deductibility of bad
debts, is another area where the status of trade or business is of
vital importance to the taxpayer. Problems arise in this area when
the bad debt belongs to the taxpayer's closely-held corporation.
The general rule is that unless a taxpayer is engaged in an exten-
sive lending business, it is very difficult for a taxpayer to qualify
his bad debts as business bad debts. Normally, it takes extensive
and continuous activities for a debtor to prove that his promo-
tional and lending activities are sufficient to be classified as a trade
87. Id. at 1073-75.
88. Id. at 1077.
89. Higgins, 312 U.S. at 478.
90. I.R.C. § 166 (CCH 1983) provides in pertinent part:
(a)(1) Wholly worthless debts--There shall be allowed as a deduction any
debt which becomes worthless within the taxable year.
(d)(1) General rule-In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation-
(A) subsections (a) and (c) shall not apply to any nonbusiness debt....
(2) Nonbusiness debt defined-For purposes of paragraph (1), the
term "nonbusiness debt" means a debt other than-
(A) a debt created or acquired (as the case may be) in connection with a trade
or business of the taxpayer; or
(B) a debt the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's
trade or business.
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or business. Once again, the question is one of fact." As was the
case with the securities investor, judicial opinion differs as to what
facts can raise a shareholder's lending activities to the level of
trade or business.
A. Lending Activity: No Trade or Business
The issue of what constitutes a "trade or business" in the con-
text of lending activity is not new to the tax laws. Perhaps the
leading case in this area is the United States Supreme Court opin-
ion of Whipple v. Commissioner." The issue in Whipple centered
around the deductibility of loans which were made to a corporation
owned substantially by the taxpayer and which later went bad.
The taxpayer sought to justify the deductions by claiming, in the
alternative, that he was in the trade or business of organizing, pro-
moting, managing, and financing corporations, or general financing
and lending of money, or operating a bottling business, or all
three.9
The Court, upholding the Commissioner, stated that devoting
one's time and energy to a corporation is not in and of itself a
trade or business. While this activity may produce income, the re-
turn is characteristic of the process of investing as distinguished
from the trade or business of the taxpayer himself. When the re-
turn is only that of an investor, the taxpayer has not demonstrated
that he is engaged in a trade or business because investing is not a
trade or business." Further, the Court reasoned that since the tax-
payer did not dispute the fact that there was no intention of devel-
oping corporations as ongoing businesses for sale, the dispositive
issue was whether one who actively serves his own corporation for
future income is in a trade or business. The Court found this argu-
ment untenable in light of Higgins, stating that "[a]bsent substan-
tial additional evidence, furnishing management and other services
to corporations for a reward not different from that flowing to an
investor in those corporations is not a trade or business."' 5
Although decided prior to Whipple, the case of Putnam v. Com-
missioner 6 exemplifies the Higgins premise. The taxpayer in Put-
nam was a lawyer who entered into a venture to publish a labor
91. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
92. 373 U.S. 193 (1963).
93. Whipple v. Comm'r, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 187, 191 (1960).
94. Whipple, 373 U.S. at 202 (emphasis supplied).
95. Id. at 203.
96. 352 U.S. 82 (1956).
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newspaper. Putnam supplied the start-up corporate costs and also
made cash advances to the new corporation. Putnam also guaran-
teed two notes given by the corporation to a bank.9' The corpora-
tion was unsuccessful and Putnam ended up discharging the corpo-
rate debts. Putnam deducted the amounts as a loss incurred in a
transaction for profit, though not connected with a trade or busi-
ness under section 23(e)(2) of the 1939 Code. 98 The Commissioner
disallowed the deduction and determined that the loss was a non-
business bad debt, resulting in short term capital loss treatment
under section 23(k) of the 1939 Code. 9
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court accepted the Com-
missioner's argument that the loss was a nonbusiness bad debt.
Implicitly acknowledging that one is not in a trade or business by
virtue of making loans to one's own corporation, the Court said:
"There is no real or economic difference between the loss of an
investment made in the form of a direct loan to a corporation and
one made indirectly in the form of a guaranteed bank loan."'
Courts, in applying this principle, usually consider loans made by a
taxpayer as investments and, following the Higgins decision, find
that such lending activities do not constitute a trade or business.10'
Like the taxpayer in Putnam, the petitioner in Rollins v. Com-
missioner"02 was a lawyer who participated in a variety of business
ventures. In 1950, the taxpayer advanced $20,000 to one of his bus-
iness concerns, which became worthless in 1952, and, from 1947
through 1953, advanced a total of over $110,000 to another of his
enterprises, which also became worthless.103 In addition to his law
practice, the petitioner also was actively engaged as an insurance
investigator and adjustor, and over a thirty-year period partici-
pated in twenty-two business ventures. He deducted the full
amount of his losses as business bad debts, asserting that he was in
the business of "promoting, organizing, financing, managing, and
making loans to business enterprises."1' 4
The court stated that in only a limited number of instances have
97. Id. at 85.
98. Currently I.R.C. § 165(c)(2) (CCH 1983).
99. Currently I.R.C. § 166(a) (CCH 1983).
100. Putnam, 352 U.S. at 92-93.
101. See Saunders, supra note 1, at 726.
102. 32 T.C. 604 (1959).
103. Perhaps Rollins should have been aware of the potential for failure since his ad-
vances were used to finance the production of "bean nippers" and "tomato skinners." Id. at
608.
104. Id. at 612.
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promotional and lending activities been sufficiently extensive and
continuous to rise to the level of being a trade or business. Quoting
Berwind v. Commissioner,0 an earlier Tax Court opinion, the
court said:
The authority ... [of such "promoter" or "lender" cases] is ap-
plicable only to the exceptional situations where the taxpayer's
activities in promoting, financing, managing, and making loans to
a number of corporations have been regarded as so extensive as to
constitute a business separate and distinct from the business car-
ried on by the corporations themselves.'"
Despite the twenty-two business activities over a thirty-year pe-
riod, the court felt that the petitioner had not met the burden of
proving that he was in the business of promoting corporations. The
court pointed out that many of his advances to his corporations
were simply bank endorsements or guarantees of corporate loans.
However, this has not proven a problem in other cases in which the
separate business of corporate promotion has been found.10 7 Also,
the court pointed out that many of the advances were to thinly
capitalized enterprises and may have been capital contributions in-
stead of genuine loans. Further, the court noted the absence of any
evidence of indebtedness, another area other courts have not found
troublesome. 0 8
In sum, the court felt that Rollins was motivated more by his
interest as an investor than as an independent promoter. Citing
Higgins for support, the court said: "It is now well settled that
activity involving the protection or enhancement of one's invest-
ments, or otherwise involving their management, however exten-
sive or time consuming, does not constitute a separate trade or
business."109
Perhaps not so compelling a set of facts as was found in Rollins
surfaced in the Ninth Circuit's opinion Holtz v. Commissioner. 110
The petitioner in Holtz had deducted certain corporate debts
which he had guaranteed. He claimed them as business bad debts
while the Commissioner asserted them to be nonbusiness bad
debts. The court said that "[t]o determine whether the loss was
105. 20 T.C. 808 (1953).
106. Rollins, 32 T.C. at 613.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 615.
110. 256 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1958).
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incurred in the petitioner's trade or business requires a definition
of the taxpayer's business." ' This, according to the court, "is a
mixed question of law and fact."11 2
The petitioner was the substantial owner of a retail apparel
store. Prior to the corporation's failure it had obtained extensive
loans which the petitioner had guaranteed. He was also involved in
three other corporations relating to the selling and distribution of
film, supplies and equipment, and motion picture equipment." 3
One of these corporations obtained working capital from a bank
loan which was personally guaranteed by the petitioner. Eventu-
ally, the corporation filed for bankruptcy and was dissolved. The
bank sold the corporation's collateral securities,"" realizing over
$83,000 on the sale."' This amount was claimed as a bad debt loss
incurred in a trade or business which would yield a net operating
loss carryback." 6 The Tax Court determined that the petitioner's
activities were not sufficiently extensive to establish the existence
of a separate business of promoting, organizing, financing and
managing businesses.' '7
On appeal, the petitioner argued that the decision of the Tax
Court was clearly erroneous in that his activities' fell within the
case law holding that one who finances, organizes or promotes cor-
porations is entitled to a business bad debt deduction. He had par-
ticipated, either as a lender or guarantor, in approximately 250
loans to his four corporations. The court distinguished the case of
Giblin v. Commissioner"s by saying that the taxpayer in Giblin
was in the business of promoting, organizing and financing busi-
nesses to which he contributed fifty percent of his time. According
to the Ninth Circuit, this was not the case with Holtz. The court
agreed with Holtz that Giblin should not be distinguished simply
because the petitioner in Giblin was involved with more corpora-
tions. However, the court felt that Holtz's activities did not rise to
the level of a trade or business. Clearly, courts are left with broad
discretion in making this determination.
111. Id. at 867.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The petitioner had pledged as collateral certain shares of stock valued in excess of
the amount of the loan. Id.
115. Holtz was still indebted on his guaranty in excess of $64,000 after the sale. Id.
116. The petitioner had already recovered the refund. The Commissioner sought the re-
turn of this amount as a refund illegally paid.
117. Holtz v. Comm'r, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 439 (1957).
118. 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955). See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
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The Ninth Circuit revisited the issue in United States v.
Keeler.1 9 The taxpayer, already engaged in the industrial laundry
business in Seattle, formed a corporation with three others to start
another laundry business in Canada. The three encouraged a num-
ber of persons to purchase stock and debentures of the new corpo-
ration by promising to reimburse them for any losses which might
occur as a result of their investment. The new corporation was
financially unsuccessful from the beginning. The taxpayer made
cash and credit advances totaling over $132,000 to bolster the sag-
ging enterprise. Nevertheless the fortunes of the new corporation
continued on a downward slide. Ultimately, the taxpayer was able
to recoup only $44,000 of the $132,000 he had advanced to the bus-
iness, leaving over $88,000 which he deducted as a business bad
debt under section 166.120
The district court allowed the $88,000 deduction as a business
debt. The court stated:
[Any reasonable person viewing this factual situation could come
to only one logical conclusion, that [the taxpayer] . . .joined an
enterprise which if successfully developed, would become and
benefit [his] regular course of business; that [he] entered into this
joint venture for the purpose of developing an enterprise that was
incidental to and in relation to his business, that of the industrial
laundry business.... So, I come to the inescapable conclusion
that this whole transaction entered into by this tax payer [sic]
was nothing more than for the benefit of, incidental to, and in
relation to his business, that of [the industrial laundry business]
here in Seattle. 121
Reviewing the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit relied
on the "facts and circumstances" test of Higgins to provide the
appropriate analytical framework. The government, in support of
its contention that the taxpayer's loans were not business loans,
relied on O'Neill v. Commissioner.12 2 The O'Neill court said that a
taxpayer who makes loans to his corporation can qualify for a busi-
ness loss deduction only "(1) where he is in the business of loaning
money, or (2) he is in the business of promoting, financing and
managing business enterprises."12 3 The government conceded that
119. 308 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1962).
120. Id. at 425-27.
121. Id. at 427 n.3 (emphasis supplied). The district court decision was unreported.
122. 271 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1959).
123. Id. at 48.
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the O'Neill rule is not always dispositive and that "if the loans
bear a sufficiently direct relationship to the taxpayers'" trade or
business, the loan can be a business debt even though the taxpayer
is not in the business of loaning money or promoting business
enterprises.'
The district court found that the taxpayer had advanced money
to the new corporation "to aid and to nurture and to build up his
going business here in Seattle. 12 5 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the facts revealed some of the anticipated benefits were
more "fanciful than real." In short, the court held the loans were
not sufficiently related to his Seattle business to warrant deduction
as a business bad debt. Evidently, the district court's inescapable
factual conclusion was clearly erroneous.
Two recent pronouncements demonstrate the proclivity which
still exists for the denial of trade or business status. Benak v. Com-
missioner2 6 was decided by the Tax Court in 1981. Benak involved
the usual scenario of a corporate loan gone bad coupled with the
petitioner-guarantor making good on his corporate bank loan. The
petitioner deducted the amount as a business bad debt under sec-
tion 166, claiming he was in the business of making investments in
small businesses. The court determined the petitioner's principal
business was that of an employee of his corporation. Recognizing
that one may be in more than one trade or business, the court held
that the petitioner failed to prove he was in the investment busi-
ness. He testified he had made six loans to other small businesses,
but could not substantiate the loans. According to the court, the
petitioner "utterly failed to prove that their dominant motivation
for guaranteeing the [corporate] loan. . . was a part of carrying on
an investment business. 'M27 C
The second recent Tax Court decision is Deely v. Commis-
sioner.'28 The petitioner in Deeley became financially involved in
approximately thirty business entities over a twenty-five-year pe-
riod. In addition to providing part of the initial capital, he contrib-
uted services and his expertise. He also assisted them in obtaining
financing either by personal loans or by acting as a guarantor of
124. Keeler, 308 F.2d at 429.
125. Id. at 429 n.3.
126. 77 T.C. 1213 (1981).
127. Id. at 1217. Compare Deely v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 1081 (1980), where the court said:
"It is equally clear that if the shareholder is only an investor, the same debt will be classi-
fied as a nonbusiness bad debt. 73 T.C. at 1092.
128. 73 T.C. 1081 (1980).
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their promissory notes. 29 The petitioner invested over $750,000
and had loaned over $2.25 million to his various businesses. In ad-
dition to his extensive investments in these enterprises, he simi-
larly made large investments as a passive investor in companies in
which he had no direct involvement.
In 1967, the petitioner formed a computer corporation with the
stated purpose of making it attractive for a merger and eventual
sale to the public. 30 Pursuant to this plan, he guaranteed two
notes totaling $180,000 and loaned the corporation $63,750. Before
the corporation's insolvency, all but approximately $35,715 due on
the notes and $18,067 due on the loan had been repaid. The peti-
tioner claimed these two amounts as a business bad debt.
From 1968 through 1974 the petitioner listed on his tax returns
his occupation as an oil operator, investor and inventor. When no-
tified that his returns were under examination, his accountant sub-
mitted a letter to the Service stating that the petitioner was in the
business of lending money and being an employee. 31
The court, citing Higgins, said that the issue of whether a debt is
incurred in a trade or business is a question of fact. The court rec-
ognized that a worthless debt may qualify as a business debt if the
person is in the business of promoting and selling businesses."
The court, in holding that the petitioner had not established a sep-
arate business, stated that Whipple was dispositive. The petitioner
did not show that the compensation he sought was other than the
normal investor's return. According to the court, Whipple requires
that one's activities "must be conducted for a fee or commission or
with the immediate purpose of selling the corporations at a profit
in the ordinary course of that business."1"
The petitioner never received any fees or commissions for his
promotional activities. Instead, he usually took equity interests in
his business enterprises. However, under the authority of Giblin v.
Commissioner,13 4 the petitioner maintained that he was in the
trade or business of developing business entities for eventual
resale.
129. Id. at 1084-85.
130. Id. at 1086.
131. Id. at 1087-88.
132. The court also cited Higgins for the proposition that if the shareholder is only an
investor, the same debt will be classified "as a nonbusiness bad debt, for management of
one's investments, no matter how extensive, does not constitute a trade or business." Id. at
1092.
133. Id. at 1093. This seems to be a very restrictive reading of Whipple..
134. 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955).
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The court said that in order to fall within the rule established in
Giblin, the petitioner must show "that the entities were organized
with a view to a quick and profitable sale after each business had
become established, rather than with a view to long-range invest-
ment gains." 185 According to the court, the longer the period of
time an interest is held, the more the profit is attributable to the
successful operation of the corporate business. Looking to the facts
to determine if Deeley met the Giblin standard, the court focused
on twenty-six of the business entities. Eleven entities were quickly
sold or abandoned.1 6 Sixteen were at least marginally profitable.18 7
With regard to the sixteen, the court was able to ascertain the
length of time the petitioner maintained an interest in fourteen of
them. Seven of the fourteen were held for periods longer than thir-
teen years and seven were held for periods of less than six years.138
According to the court, it was apparent that the petitioner's ac-
tivities demonstrated an initial intent to hold onto the profitable
ventures and dispose of the unprofitable ventures. " The length of
time the petitioner held these profitable entities was fatal to his
claim that he was in the trade or business.
B. Lending Activity: Trade or Business
As was the case with taxpayers engaged in personal investment
activity, certain corporate shareholders have been held to be in a
trade or business with respect to their closely-held corporations.
According to some courts, a taxpayer's loans to his corporation
when combined with extensive promotional activities may result in
a finding that the taxpayer is in the trade or business of promoting
or financing corporations. Treasury regulations reflect that the
"facts and circumstances" test provides the appropriate analytical
framework for such a determination. According to the regulation
applicable to section 166: "The question whether a debt is a non-
135. Id. This, too, seems to be a restrictive reading of Giblin since the debt in question
in that case arose out of a corporation formed on January 22, 1945, and dissolved in 1950.
Id. at 692, 694-95. Compare the time period in Giblin with the length of operation of the
corporation in Deeley, which was from 1967 through 1971. Deeley, 73 T.J. at 1090.
136. Deeley, 73 T.C. at 1094. This number alone would seem to qualify the petitioner as
a business promoter. However, the court disregarded these entities since he realized no
profit from them. Id. Apparently the court feels that only successful entrepreneurs meet the
promoter standard.
137. Id. The court stated that it would focus on twenty-six of the entities but provided
data for twenty-seven.
138. Id.
139. What successful business promoter would act otherwise?
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business debt is a question of fact in each particular case.' °4 0 A
comparison of the cases discussed previously with those discussed
below highlights the uncertainty inherent in the application of the
"facts and circumstances" test.
The leading case in the lending area is the Fifth Circuit opinion
of Giblin v. Commissioner.4 1 The petitioner was an attorney who
from 1926 to 1945 endeavored to leave the legal profession by
forming several diverse corporations. The Tax Court sustained the
Commissioner's deficiency determination because the petitioner
was not in the business of making loans to corporations."" The
Fifth Circuit reversed. Citing the Higgins "facts and circum-
stances" test, the court said that normally the Tax Court's findings
on the issue are critical. However, the court said that in this case
the Tax Court's findings were inconclusive because it based its
analysis on the fact that the petitioner was not in the business of
making loans to corporations." According to the Fifth Circuit, the
Tax Court did not "really come to grips with the issue.' 4 The
Fifth Circuit reversed because it felt the petitioner was in the busi-
ness of promoting, organizing, and investing in corporations.
However, the Tax Court had considered and rejected this claim.
According to the Tax Court: "[Wihfle the record shows that for
some years prior to the taxable year in question the petitioner also
promoted, organized, and invested in various corporations and
other business enterprises, the evidence does not show he was so
engaged in the taxable year.'" The Fifth Circuit found this state-
ment to be contrary to fact and decided that the Tax Court meant
to say that the petitioner was not engaged in the business of mak-
ing loans during the taxable years.'" Thus, the Fifth Circuit re-
versed on a factual basis, leading one to the conclusion that the
"facts and circumstances" presented there were different from
those found by the Tax Court.
The taxpayer in Mahoney v. Spencer" created three corpora-
tions to carry on a canning operation which he had previously con-
ducted as an individual. The taxpayer leased three canning plants,
140. Treas. Reg. § 1.166-5(b)(2) (1959).
141. 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955).
142. Giblin v. Comm'r, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 1009, 1011 (1954).
143. Giblin, 227 F.2d at 697.
144. Id.
145. Giblin, 13 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1011.
146. Id.
147. 172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949).
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one to each of the three corporations. He also agreed to provide
adequate financing to each corporation when required. In fulfilling
this obligation, he guaranteed over three hundred notes for a total
of $700,000. A considerable amount of this credit involved the tax-
payer mortgaging his own properties. The taxpayer spent at least a
third of his time discharging his financing obligations. The remain-
ing two-thirds of his time was spent in performing corporate func-
tions as president of the three corporations.148
The district court found that the taxpayer was engaged "in the
business of acquiring, owning, expanding, equipping and leasing
food processing plants. '' 149 The Ninth Circuit agreed, noting that
his activities were "extensive, varied, continuous and regular. 'I5 0
A similar result was reached in the memorandum decision
Yewdall v. Commissioner.5" The taxpayer in Yewdall worked ex-
clusively as a certified public accountant prior to 1945. He contin-
ued in this business in later years but only devoted a portion of his
time to it. Beginning in 1945, the taxpayer decided to finance, pro-
mote, loan money to and borrow money for various corporations,
using his established credit. 52 When one of his corporations be-
came insolvent, he deducted the amount of the loan.
The Commissioner, in determining deficiencies for 1946 and
1947, disallowed bad debt deductions totaling approximately
$14,000 and stated that the debts were nonbusiness bad debts. The
Tax Court ruled for the taxpayer, stating that he
devoted a substantial part of his time during the taxable years to
the affairs of various corporations which he promoted, financed,
and helped to operate. He testified that after limiting his activity
as an accountant, he decided to finance, promote, loan money to
and borrow money for various corporations, using his established
credit, and he actually spent a substantial amount of his time
borrowing money for, lending money to and working with several
corporations in an effort to conduct their affairs successfully. The
evidence is not overwhelming in his favor but justifies the conclu-
sion that the debts due from [the insolvent corporation] were
business debts rather than non-business debts within the mean-
ing of section 23(k).'5
148. Id.
149. Mahoney v. Spencer, 73 F. Supp. 657, 658 (D. Or. 1947).
150. Mahoney, 172 F.2d at 640.
151. 13 T.C.M. (CCH) 248 (1954).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 252. Section 23(k) is now I.R.C. § 166(a) (CCH 1983). Similar results were
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The lack of overwhelming evidence indicates the uncertainties in
this area. The taxpayer was only involved with five corporations
over a four-year period during which time he worked part-time as
a certified public accountant. As the court indicated, the facts nar-
rowly led to the conclusion that his activities had risen to the level
of a trade or business.
The Tax Court reached a similar result in Campbell v. Commis-
sioner.15" The court allowed the deduction of the petitioners' loans
to their corporation as a business bad debt because they were in
the business of organizing and operating corporations engaged in
the retail coal business. The petitioners had twelve such corpora-
tions. Since the loans had a direct connection with their business
of operating coal corporations, they were entitled to the deduction
as business bad debts.15 5
The Campbell decision was apparently partially overturned by
Whipple.'" The Whipple Court said that one who actively engages
in serving his own corporation for the purpose of creating future
income is not in a trade or business. 15 7 The Court said: "To the
extent that they hold or contain statements to the contrary, we
disapprove of such cases as . . . Campbell .. ."158 Whether the
Tax Court's decision in Campbell stands for the proposition disap-
proved in Whipple is questionable. The losses incurred in Camp-
bell were, according to the Tax Court, "directly a result of. . . the
business of organizing and operating corporations.' ' 5
In Commissioner v. Moffat,"10 the issue was whether a taxpayer's
leasing of coal lands to his corporation constituted a trade or busi-
ness. The taxpayer was originally engaged in the business of min-
ing his land as a sole proprietor. He later decided to incorporate
and eventually ended up subsidizing the corporate debt, deducting
those amounts as business bad debts. 6' The Tax Court found that
Moffat was
very actively and constantly engaged in the business of owning,
leasing and seeing to the proper operation of his coal lands....
reached in Scott v. Comm'r, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 1029 (1955).
154. 11 T.C. 510 (1948).
155. Id. at 511-12.
156. Whipple, 373 U.S. at 203 n.10.
157. Id. at 203.
158. Id. at 203 n.10.
159. Campbell, 11 T.C. at 512.
160. 373 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1967).
161. Id. at 845.
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His guarantee of the Moffat Coal Company borrowing as well as
his payment of the indebtedness in 1960 were not only proxi-
mately but directly related to that business .... The argument
that this debt was not a business debt is refuted by the evidence
presented. 162
The Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the factual determi-
nation made by the Tax Court was not clearly erroneous.1 3 The
court also agreed with the Tax Court's determination that the
loans were directly related to the taxpayer's leasing business, thus
entitling him to a business bad debt deduction.'
V. CONCLUSION
The Ditunno opinion noted that other courts have used the
"facts and circumstances" test without problems. Judge Tannen-
wald predicted that havoc would accompany the abandonment of
the "holding one's self out" criteria. As is the nature of the "facts
and circumstances" test, the determination is certainly subjective
and each case is decided on the facts presented. There is unpre-
dictability with such an approach, however, because there are no
established fact patterns to which a court can refer. Does one rely
on the number of investments made, the value of these invest-
ments, the number of closely-held corporations developed, the
number which were successful, the amount loaned to the busi-
nesses, or other factors? Clearly, the fewer the fixed criteria that
are available the more discretion is available to both the taxpayer
and the Service.
Perhaps the safest generalization which can be made is that one
should not count on being classified as being in the trade or busi-
ness absent solid factual support. The maxim that deductions are a
matter of legislative grace is inherent in the judicial decisions.
Courts are more likely to agree with the Service that "trade or bus-
iness" status is not easily attained.
However, contrary judicial authority is available. The phrase's
evolution is now at the stage where one relies on the facts of each
individual case to determine trade or business status. The problem
is that no one is certain of which facts are sufficient. Facts which
are dispositive to some courts are relatively insignificant to others.
162. Moffat v. Comm'r, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 961, 964 (1965).
163. Moffat, 373 F.2d at 847.
164. Id.
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Certainty in the tax law would be better served if more, instead of
less, specific criteria were established.

